DISCOURSE AND RACISM: European Perspectives

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Abstract This paper provides an overview of the main approaches to the discursive analysis of racist utterances. Moreover, we discuss the notions of racism and race historically and from the point of view of different cultures and languages. We restrict ourselves to the discourse analytical concepts and methodologies, which vary greatly, both in theory and in analysis. We present one example and analyze it in detail as an illustration of the linguistic tools that help make hidden and latent meanings transparent.

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INTRODUCTION

The starting point of a discourse-analytical approach to the complex phenomenon of racism is to realize that racism, as a social construct, as a social practice, and as an ideology, manifests itself discursively. On the one hand, racist opinions and
beliefs are produced and reproduced by means of discourse, and through discourse, discriminatory exclusionary practices are prepared, promulgated, and legitimated.

On the other hand, discourse serves to criticize, delegitimate, and argue against racist opinions and practices, i.e. to pursue antiracist strategies. Detailed analyses of discursive examples help to show and to reconstruct this discursive production and reproduction of racism and the accompanying discursive counteractions. Because we are bound by constraints of space, we illustrate the concrete discursive manifestation of racism by analyzing a short excerpt from an interview with a politician.

THE CONCEPTS OF RACE AND RACISM

Race: An Historical-Political Etymological Overview

Currently, it is an undeniable fact for geneticists and biologists that the concept of race, in reference to human beings, has nothing to do with biology (e.g. Jacquard 1996:20). From a social functional point of view, race is a social construction. On the one hand, it has been used as a legitimating ideological tool to suppress and exploit specific social groups and to deny them access to material and cultural resources, work, welfare services, housing, political rights, etc. On the other hand, these affected groups have adopted the idea of race. They have turned the concept around and used it to construct an alternative, positive self-identity; they have also used it as a basis for political resistance (see Miles 1993:28) and to fight for more autonomy, independence, and participation.

From a linguistic point of view the term race has a relatively young, although not precisely clear, etymological history. There is some documentation dating from the sixteenth century, when the term (razza in Italian, raza in Spanish, raca in Portuguese, and race in French) also appeared in English. The term has alternatingly entered different semantic fields, for example, (a) the field of ordinal and classificational notions that include such words as genus, species, and variety; (b) the field that includes social and political group denominations such as nation, and Volk, and, more rarely, dynasty, ruling house, generation, class, and family; and (c) the field that includes notions referring to language groups and language families1 such as Germanen (Teutons) and Slavs (see Conze & Sommer 1984:135). The prescientific (up to the eighteenth century) meaning of race in

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1The contribution of philology and linguistics to the construction and taxonomization of "races" and to the legitimation of racism was an extraordinarily inglorious one. Apart from the synecdochical usurpation and generalization and the mythicization of "the Aryan" (see Poliakow 1993, Römer 1985, Conze & Sommer 1984:159), philology and linguistics are responsible for at least three serious faults: (a) the confusion of language relationship and speaker relationship, (b) the discriminatory hierarchy of languages and language types, and (c) the metaphorical, naturalizing description of languages as organisms that provide the basis for the connection and approximation of race classifications and language classifications (see Römer 1985).
regard to human beings was mainly associated with aristocratic descent to and membership of a specific dynasty or ruling house. The term primarily denoted nobility and quality, but because it had no reference to somatic criteria, the pseudobiological and anthropological systematizations of the term during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries soon conformed its meaning to overgeneralized, phenotypic features designated to categorize people from all continents and countries. The idea of race became closely incorporated into political-historical literature and was conceptually transferred to the terminology of human history. In the second half of the nineteenth century, the concept, now with historical and national attributes, was linked to Social Darwinism—which can be traced to Darwin’s theory of evolution only in part—and became an “in” word outside the natural sciences. Race theorists interpreted history as a racial struggle within which only the fittest races would have the right to survive. They employed the political catchword with its vague semantic contours almost synonymously with the words nation and Volk for purposes of their biopolitical programs of racial cleansing, eugenics, and birth control.

The extremely radicalized race theory of the German anti-Semites and National Socialists in the tradition of Arthur de Gobineau, Houston Stewart Chamberlain, and Georg Ritter von Schönerer tied together syncretistically the religious, nationalist, economic, culturalist, and biologic anti-Semitism, which then served as the ideology to legitimize systematic, industrialized genocide. It was this use of the race theory “…that stimulated a more thorough critical appraisal of the idea of ‘race’ in Europe and North America and the creation of the concept of racism in the 1930s” (Miles 1993:29).

2We omit discussion of the language-specific usage of the term race in reference to animals, plants, and even extrabiological groupings of things, such as type or sort (see Conze & Sommer 1984, Guillaumin 1991:70, Garzanti 1984:725, Duden 1989: 1214f).
3The terms anti-Semitism and anti-Semitic, which post-festum cover the whole range of religious, economic, nationalist, socialist, Marxist, culturalist, and “racially” prejudicial aversion and aggression against Jews, were probably coined in 1879 in the agitational, anti-Semitic circle of the German writer Wilhelm Marr (see Nipperdey & Ruep 1972). At that time the word “anti-Semitic” was employed as a self-descriptive, political “fighting word.” In 1935, the National Socialist Ministry of Propaganda (Reichspropagandaministerium) issued a language regulation in which it prescribed that the term should be avoided in the press and replaced with the term “anti-Jewish” (antijüdisch), “…for the German policy only aims at the Jews, not at the Semites as a whole” (quoted from Nipperdey & Ruep 1972:151). Undoubtedly, the term “anti-Semitic” has been used in postwar Germany and in postwar Austria more often than during the National Socialist reign of terror. This is because the term has become a politically “stigmatic word” for use in describing others and its meaning has been expanded in the analysis of anti-Jewish aggression throughout history.
4The term racism was probably first used in a title for an unpublished German book written by Magnus Hirschfeld in 1933–1934. In this book, which was translated and published in English in 1938, Hirschfeld argued against the pseudoscientifically backed contention that there exists a hierarchy of biologically distinct races (see Miles 1993:29). The actual linguistic career of the term started in the postwar period (Sondermann 1995:47).
Since 1945, use of the word race in the German-speaking countries of Germany and Austria has been strictly taboo for politicians, for academics, and even for the people in general. In France, the expression relations de race would also be regarded as racist (Wieviorka 1994:173). On the other hand, the term race relations is still commonly used in the United Kingdom and in the United States. Research about racism must take into account these differences in language use. Misinterpretations can lead to difficulties in translation and even to mistakes in shaping different analytical categories used when dealing with the issue of racism (see Wieviorka 1994:173).

Defining Racism

“Racism,” the stigmatizing headword and political fighting word, is on almost everyone’s lips today, probably because its meaning has become extraordinarily expanded and evasive. There is talk of genetic, biological, cultural, ethnopluralist, institutional, and everyday racism, of a racism at the top, of an elite racism, of a racism in the middle, of an old and a new or neoracism, of a positive racism, and of an inegalitarian and a differentialist racism. Because of this inflationary use, there is no commonly acknowledged definition of the term. Thus, we only mention a few recent terminological approaches to the concept.

According to Memmi (1992:103), “racism” refers to the generalized and absolute evaluation of real or fictitious differences that is advantageous to the accuser and detrimental to his or her victim. With this negative judgment, the accuser wants to legitimize his or her privileges or aggressions. In this characterization, the meaning of racism in the very strict sense is lost. Thus, Memmi suggests an exclusive definition of racism that encompasses the evaluation of both real or fictitious biological differences. In contrast to this, his neologism heterophobia—coined in analogy to xenophobia—is designated to denote all phobic and aggressive constellations that are directed against others, and that are legitimized by different psychological, cultural, social, or metaphysical arguments (Memmi 1992:121).

According to Guillaumin (1991:164) and Claussen (1994:5), every racism is a syncretism, an ideological mixtum compositum of different pseudoscientific doctrines, religious and confessional beliefs, and stereotypical opinions that thereby constructs a pseudocausal connection between phenotypic, social, mental, symbolic, and fictitious traits (for an analysis of anti-Semitism as a syncretic phenomenon see Mitten 1992). Simultaneously, racism means (a) a practical behavior (on the street, in the workplace, in institutions, etc), (b) a political program, (c) a legal structure (e.g. citizenship conferred according to jus sanguinis), and (d) a practical state policy (e.g. the projection of a “clean race,” or adop-

5Racist discrimination is pathologized and played down through the disease metaphor of phobia because, as such, it exculpates racists, at least in words. This critique is also valid for terms like xenophobia.
tion of the policy of apartheid). However, the distinction between the last three points seems to be arbitrary and questionable because both the legal structure and state policies are political affairs and concerns.

Essed (1991, 1992) holds the view that “racism must be understood as ideology, structure and process in which inequalities inherent in the wider social structure are related, in a deterministic way, to biological and cultural factors attributed to those who are seen as a different ‘race’or ‘ethnic group’” (1991:43). Apart from the fact that Essed’s definition intermingles “racism” with “ethnicism” (the mixing of these two isms is common in current theories about racism, as is the mixing of racial with ethnic, although the latter notion is unquestioned and presupposed), there are good reasons for replacing the abstractive notion of process in her definition with the terms action or practice, because she herself points to the practical dimension when she explains why she chose the term process: “...racism is a ‘process’ because structures and ideologies do not exist outside the everyday practices through which they are created and confirmed. These practices both adapt to and themselves contribute to changing social, economic, and political conditions in society” (Essed 1991:43, 1992:375).

However, one of the most interesting points in this approach is the theoretical elaboration of “everyday racism.” The concept of everyday racism is designated to integrate, by definition, macro- and micro-sociological dimensions of racism (Essed 1991:16). After having criticized the dichotomic distinction between institutional and individual racism as erroneously placing the individual outside the institutional, even though “structures of racism do not exist external to agents—they are made by agents—but specific practices are by definition racist only when they activate existing structural racial inequality in the system” (Essed 1991:36), Essed explains her understanding of the term everyday: “...the ‘everyday’ can be tentatively defined as socialized meanings making practices immediately definable and uncontested so that, in principle, these practices can be managed according to (sub)cultural norms and expectations. These practices and meanings belong to our familiar world and usually involve routine or repetitive practices” (Essed 1991:50). Building on this definition, she goes on to say that everyday racism can be characterized as “process in which (a) socialized racist notions are integrated into meanings that make practices immediately definable and uncontested so that, in principle, these practices can be managed according to (sub)cultural norms and expectations. These practices and meanings belong to our familiar world and usually involve routine or repetitive practices” (Essed 1991:52).

One of the most systematic and radical approaches to the issue of “race” and “racism” is that of Miles (1993). In his view, in order to analyze “race problems” adequately, one must eliminate all conceptions of race as a thing in itself with the power to exert effects. One must do this despite the fact that the idea of “race” constitutes an element of common sense: “There are no ‘races’ and therefore no ‘race relations’. There is only a belief that there are such things, a belief which is
used by some social groups to construct an Other (and therefore the Self) in thought as a prelude to exclusion and domination, and by other social groups to define Self (and so to construct an Other) as a means of resisting that exclusion. Hence, if it is used at all, the idea of ‘race’ should be used only to refer descriptively to such uses of the idea of ‘race’” (1993:42).

Miles’ analysis of racism unfolds around five key concepts. The notion of “racialization” denotes the dynamic and dialectical representational process of categorization and meaning construction in which specified meanings are ascribed to real or fictitious somatic features (see Miles 1992:100, 1983:157).

In order to avoid a semantic overstretch of the term, Miles wants to regard racism exclusively as an ideological and representational phenomenon analytically distinguished from exclusionary practice. The latter is thought to refer to concrete intentional actions as well as to unintentional material consequences, both of which lead to an unequal (hierarchical) treatment and disadvantaging of persons in the allocation of resources and services. [Miles suggests this distinction in order to avoid conclusions that assume a monocausal (racist) explanation of discriminatory practices and thereby do not take into account that a concrete exclusionary practice might be multideterminational and that racism is but one of its various causes]. Racism, as an ideology both of exclusion and inclusion, can be either a relatively coherent, pseudological theory or a quite incoherent accumulation of prejudiced clichés, images, attributions, and arguments. In any case, it presupposes racialization, although the racialization of the involved social groups does not provide sufficient condition to qualify a statement or occurrence as racist. An explicit negative judgment of a racialized group must also be present for such a qualification to be made. In this judgment, the depreciatory features ascribed to the constructed race can be both biological and cultural. The fourth key concept in Miles’ theory about racism is that of institutional racism. Miles defines it idiosyncratically as racism under circumstances marked by exclusionary practices that developed from a racist discourse that has become silent (because it was no longer accepted as a legitimization of the exclusionary practices) or that has been replaced with a new discourse (also as a result of a taboo). At this point, it is difficult to see why the silence should be the *conditio sine qua non* to label something as “institutional racism.” In the case of the acquisition of the citizenship according to *jus sanguinis*, the aspect of institutionalization is by no means denied by the fact that the law is explicitly oriented toward the racist categorization by blood. Miles’ fifth concept—that of ideological articulation—is used to illuminate how ideologies (e.g. racism, nationalism, sexism, ethnicism, etc) verge on each other, how they are connected, and how they overlap (for the ideological connection of race and nation see Miles 1993:79).

The chronological distinction between “old” and “new” racism was introduced by Barker (1981) and taken up by Taguieff (1987), Balibar & Wallerstein (1988), Balibar (1991), and Kalpaka & Räthzel (1986), among others. Miles prefers the chronologically neutral distinction (proposed by Taguieff in 1987) between an
“inegalitarian” and a “differentialist” racism, and notes: “although acknowledging that this distinction is not as precise as its creator presumes” (1994:199). The reason why Miles understandably refuses to speak in terms of old and new racism lies in the uncertainty regarding the concept of neoracism—characterized as racism grounded in the stress of cultural differences—and whether this racism is really fundamentally new and different. Because of the fundamentally syncretic nature of racism, which can be described in terms of ideological articulation, even the classical, pseudoscientific racism of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries always included a reference to the cultural or national character and to uniqueness (see Rattansi 1994:55).

Insofar as our own concept of racism is concerned, we keep in mind Miles’ caveat regarding hasty monocausal assumptions of a relationship between exclusionary practices and racist opinions. Nevertheless, we assume that racism is both an ideology of a syncretic kind and a discriminatory social (including discursive) practice that could be institutionalized and backed by the hegemonic social groups. Racism is based on the hierarchical construction of groups of persons that are characterized as communities of descent and to whom are attributed specific collective, naturalized, or biologically termed traits that are considered to be almost invariable. These traits are primarily related to biological features, appearance, cultural practices, customs, traditions, language, or socially stigmatized ancestors. These traits are—explicitly or implicitly, directly or indirectly—evaluated negatively, and this judgment is closely in accord with hegemonic views. As an ideological mixtum compositum, racism combines different, and sometimes even contradictory, doctrines, religious beliefs, and stereotypes, thereby constructing an almost invariable pseudocausal connection between—what could be fictitious—biological (genetic and phenotypic), social, cultural, and mental traits.

FIVE DISCOURSE-ANALYTICAL APPROACHES TO RACISM

Prejudices and Stereotypes

Quasthoff (1973, 1978, 1980, 1987, 1989) was one of the first discourse analysts to attempt to study and categorize prejudiced discourse. Her first major analysis

6Although the concept of “inegalitarian racism” is designated to denote the legitimization of domination, discrimination, and separation based on overt doctrines in support of genetic, biological inferiority, “differentialist racism”—a concept more or less synonymous with the notion of “cultural racism,” better labeled as “culturalist racism”—emphasizes cultural differences (including lifestyles, habits, customs, and manners) and paints a threatening picture of the mixing and interbreeding of cultures and ethnic groups. “Ethnopluralist racism,” which tries to legitimize strict segregation and discrimination by claiming that multiculturalism threatens cultural and ethnic purity and leads to contamination, degeneration, and decline, can be categorized as a specific type of culturalist or differentialist racism. For a discussion of the logic of racism as described above, see Wieviorka (1994:182 ff.).
of social prejudices (1973) does not completely transcend the sentence level, but she opens the field for further research. Quasthoff distinguishes between attitudes, convictions, and prejudices. She defines “attitudes” as the affective position taken toward a person one relates to and to whom one can express dislike or sympathy. “Convictions” ascribe qualities to others and often provide rationalizations for negative attitudes (e.g. that “Blacks smell bad”). “Prejudices” are mental states defined (normally) as negative attitudes (the affective element) toward social groups with matching stereotypic convictions or beliefs.

For the purposes of linguistic access, Quasthoff defines the term stereotype as the verbal expression of a certain conviction or belief directed toward a social group or an individual as a member of that social group. The stereotype is typically an element of common knowledge, shared to a high degree in a particular culture (see Quasthoff 1987:786, 1978). It takes the logical form of a judgment that attributes or denies, in an oversimplified and generalizing manner and with an emotionally slanted tendency, particular qualities or behavioral patterns to a certain class of persons (Quasthoff 1973:28).

To explain the function of social prejudice, Quasthoff considers several psychological approaches that, on the one hand, describe prejudice (inner psychic functions of stereotypes) as an integral part of authoritarian systems (Adorno et al 1950, Mitscherlich & Mitscherlich 1977), and that on the other, provide a scapegoat theory explanation (social functions of stereotypes). Quasthoff also stresses that the externalization of prejudices in the form of stereotype functions as a socially unifying and cohesive means for phatic communion. In addition, she rightly argues that social prejudices also have a cognitive-linguistic orientation function. They simplify communication within one’s own group, strengthen the sense of belonging, and delineate the outgroup. This is particularly the case during periods of internal strife and in times of rapid social change. As to the changeability of stereotypic beliefs, Quasthoff’s investigations suggest that specific (frequent, relatively close, and permanent) forms of personal contact with members of the respective outgroup can positively influence attitudes and beliefs with respect to the outgroup.

Quasthoff’s investigations cover all kinds of social prejudices and stereotypes, not only racist and nationalist ones. On the basis of semantic and formal logical criteria, Quasthoff (1973) distinguishes four categories of stereotypic expressions according to different degrees of directness:

1. “Analytical” propositions that claim to express a truth are the basic form of stereotypes. All stereotypes can be traced back to this structure. A quality or behavior pattern is ascribed to a group. The group is the subject, and the quality or behavior pattern is the predicate. A stereotype of this type takes the form of a statement. From the point of view of logic it is a generalization that can be formalized by use of a universal quantifier as the specific analytical judgment (e.g. Germans are industrious and hardworking), which suggests that the predicate ascribed to the subject is intentional on the part of the subject and is an essential, inherent, and intrinsic feature of the group.
2. Modified (restricted) statements are limited in force or, strictly speaking, in the possibility to fix the speaker's or writer's own perspective, through the use of certain signals (like the subjunctive or the interrogative mood, or impersonal constructions with verba dicendi or sentiendi) in the surface structure of the utterances (e.g. "Gypsies are said to have a reputation for stealing"); "Turks are believed not to be interested in decent housing"). The semantics of such statements does not show whether the speaker is simply reporting a hegemonic prejudiced opinion or subscribes to it personally.

3. Directly expressed stereotypes are utterances in which the speaker explicitly refers to herself or himself by means of personal constructions that consist of the deictic expression "I" and a verbum putandi or a verbum cogitandi (e.g. "I don't think that the Americans are up to our intellectual depth at all").

4. In the case of the text linguistic type, the stereotype is expressed implicitly (e.g. "He is Jewish, but he's very nice"), and the prejudiced meaning that Jews are normally not nice is presupposed or inferable. The interpretation of text linguistic stereotypes relies on knowledge of context and transcends the sentence level. Inference-triggering devices such as specific adverbs (e.g. the adversative conjunction "but" in the example mentioned above) suggest this interpretation.

Quasthoff's four categories cover a broad range of verbal expressions and nuances. Because the four types express different grades of directness, their occurrence depends to a great deal on situation and setting. As a result of tolerance norms, types two and four occur most frequently.

However, a categorization according to the sentence structure of the most obvious prejudices is only partially fit to grasp latent meanings, allusions, indirect strategies, vague formulations, implications, and forms of argumentation, all of which can extend beyond a single sentence and characterize written texts or oral discourse connected with prejudice and racism (for a definition of "text" and "discourse" see van Dijk 1990:164, Ehlich 1983, Schiffrin 1994:20–44, Wodak 1996:12 ff.). Quasthoff's fourth category of stereotypical expression already transcends the single-sentence perspective. In addition, Quasthoff herself investigated the role of stereotypes in narratives (1980) and argumentative discourse (1978)7, and thus broadened her linguistic horizons in regard to social prejudice.

The Socio-Cognitive Approach

The model of prejudice use by van Dijk (1984) is partially based on sociopsychological considerations similar to those of Quasthoff. According to van Dijk, preju-

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7When, for example, she applied Toulmin's schematism (1969) to the microstructural level of argumentations, Quasthoff came to the conclusion that stereotypes do not exclusively, or even primarily, appear as warrants. If they are used to support a claim, they appear usually as a backing (Quasthoff 1978:27). Moreover, stereotypes can themselves be either data or claims, supported, in their turn, by other kinds of propositions.
dice “is not merely a characteristic of individual beliefs or emotions about social groups, but a shared form of social representation in group members, acquired during processes of socialization and transformed and enacted in social communication and interaction. Such ethnic attitudes have social functions, e.g. to protect the interests of the ingroup. Their cognitive structures and the strategies of their use reflect these social functions” (van Dijk 1984:13). Van Dijk does not neatly distinguish between ethnicism, racism, and adjacent forms of discrimination [for a recent discussion of these concepts see van Dijk et al (1997)].

Although Quasthoff generally stresses the marking of distance toward outgroups and the establishment of ingroup solidarity (and phatic communion) as social functions of prejudice, van Dijk focuses on the “rationalization and justification of discriminatory acts against minority groups” in more detail (van Dijk 1984:13). He designates the categories used to rationalize prejudice against minority groups as “the 7 D’s of discrimination.” They are dominance, differentiation, distance, diffusion, diversion, depersonalization or destruction, and daily discrimination. These strategies serve in various ways to legitimize and enact the distinction of “the other,” for example, by dominating the minority groups, by excluding them from social activities, and even by destroying and murdering them. According to van Dijk, “These general plan categories will organize, in principle, all actions against, about, or with minority members, viz. maintaining power and control, treating them differently (a social act function related to the cognitive function of seeing them differently), keeping them at a distance (out of our country, town, neighborhood, street, house, family, etc.), diffusing beliefs and prejudices about them (mainly in prejudiced talk, attributing social or economic problems of the ingroup to them, treating them as inferior, hurting or destroying them, and, finally, enacting all these more general actions also in small everyday activities (minor inequities)” (van Dijk 1984:40).

For the elaboration of a discourse-analytical theory about racist discourse, one of the most valuable contributions of van Dijk’s model is the heuristic assistance it provides in linking the generation of prejudice to discursive units larger than the sentence. Van Dijk’s initial assumption is that those parts of the long-term memory directly relevant to the production and retention of ethnic prejudices (recognition, categorization, and storage of experience) can be divided into three memory structures: the semantic memory, the episodic memory, and the control system.

According to van Dijk, semantic memory is social memory: It is here that the collectively shared beliefs of a society are stored. These beliefs are organized as attitudes and as such are fitted into group schemata that provide the cognitive basis of our information processing about members of outgroups. Our perception of individual experiences is thus influenced by these cognitive representations, which are always adapted to preexisting models. The models themselves are initially acquired during socialization. The attitudes stored in the group schemata are of a generalized and abstract nature and are determined by their organization in socially relevant categories of the group that is being evaluated. In van Dijk’s view, the following three categories are decisive for establishing ethnic prejudice: national origin and/or appearance, socioeconomic status, and sociocultural norms
and values, religion, and language [although here again, he does not distinguish between racist, nationalist, and ethnicist beliefs (see Mitten & Wodak 1993:93 ff.).] In linguistic utterances, such attitudes appear as generally accepted statements divorced from the current context (e.g. “Jews are good business people”).

Moreover, continues van Dijk, episodic memory retains personal or narrated experiences and events as well as patterns abstracted from these experiences. The listener constructs a textual representation of a story in episodic memory. This representation allows the listener to reproduce, if necessary, what was told and also how it was told. The listener constructs a model of the story (situation model) that is richer than the discourses about it. Such a model also features previous experiences about the same or similar situations and will also embody instantiated information from general group schemata (van Dijk 1984:25). The general situational models are the link between narrated events or personally retained experiences and the structures of the semantic memory.

Consequently (still in reference to the example quoted above), one unfavorable experience of doing business with a Jewish merchant becomes a situational model that states that doing business with Jews will always have negative results.

The third and final part of long-term memory that van Dijk designates is the control system. Its task is to link communicative aims and interests (e.g. persuasion) with the situational and individual social conditions (e.g. the level of education, gender, and relationship to the person one is addressing). Van Dijk calls the processes involved in the perception, interpretation, storage, use, or retrieval of ethnic information about minority groups and their actions “strategies.” The control system coordinates these various strategies and at the same time monitors the flow of information from long-term memory to short-term memory as well as the storage or activation of situation models in episodic memory.8

One of the main strategies of the control system is to link a positive self-presentation—i.e. one acceptable to society and signaling tolerance—with an existing negative attitude to foreigners. Positive self-presentations are expressed in phrases such as “Personally, I have nothing against Jews, but the neighbors say....” The interaction of these three memory systems thus both directly and indirectly influences the decoding and encoding—that take place in the short-term memory—of the received and/or self-produced remarks about minorities. Van Dijk’s model can thus explain the cognitive processes of the text recipients: Isolated experiences, statements, and symbols are assigned to general schemata and confirm existing prejudices.

Van Dijk (1984, 1991) analyzes prejudice stories that were elicited systematically at certain points in interviews with different groups of informants in Amsterdam and in the United States. These stories are often introduced by procataleptic disclaimers, which allow a positive self-presentation for the speaker: (a) apparent

8It is not clear why van Dijk only characterizes semantic memory as social. The way we understand its function, the control system relies heavily on societal and historical norms. It links group beliefs and cognition with the traditions and rules of a society. In any case, the control system is related to a different domain of cognition than the semantic and episodic memory and is qualitatively different from both.
denials ("I have nothing against Blacks, Turks, Jews, but"), (b) apparent admissions ("Of course there are also smart Blacks, Turks, Jews, but"), (c) transfer ("I don't mind so much, but my neighbor, colleagues"), and (d) contrast ("We always had to work a lot, but they...").

Van Dijk is able to show in a thorough analysis of these stories that the narrative schema developed by Labov & Waletzky (1967) is used, with the one exception that a resolution is often missing. Consequently, the listener should draw her or his own conclusions. This "openness" is another profession to the official norm and exempts the speaker from any responsibility. The speakers do not suggest that any measures be taken; they only relate a story. Such narratives cluster around a very small and precise number of topics. Immigrants threaten the population, they are criminal, and their cultural traditions are alien.

Though van Dijk's model can probably account for a wider range of discursive manifestations of prejudice than can Quasthoff's, at times his explicit cognitive approach does not seem to accord sufficient weight to the affective and sociohistorical aspects of prejudiced discourse that can influence the schematic categorization and perception of reality. Prejudice becomes comprehensible only within its psychological, social, historical, and linguistic context, and van Dijk's model could differentiate more in these areas. Yet the insights gained by van Dijk's use of the prejudice story are considerable.

More recently, van Dijk (1991, 1993; van Dijk et al 1997) has turned to the analysis of "elite racism" and to the integration of the concept of ideology into his socio-cognitive model. He has focused on the investigation of newspaper editorials, school books, academic discourse, and interviews with managers, with the basic assumption that the elite produce and reproduce the racism that is then implemented and enacted in other social fields. We certainly believe that the elite play a significant role in the reproduction of racism, but we would also maintain that a form of intertextuality and dialectics exists between public, semi-public, and private fields of discourse, and also between different discourse genres (Wodak & van Dijk 1997). The discourse-historical approach tries to complement the cognitive model with the analysis of the social and historical context.

The Discourse-Historical Approach

The discourse-historical approach should be seen as an extension of van Dijk's socio-cognitive model (Wodak 1986; 1991a, 1991b; Wodak et al 1990, 1994; Matouschek et al 1995; Mitten & Wodak 1993). It attempts to incorporate historical-political and affective levels.

The distinctive feature of this theoretical and methodological approach is the attempt to integrate systematically all available background information in the analysis and interpretation of the many layers of a text (Wodak & Reisigl 1999). The study for which this approach was developed first attempted to trace in detail the constitution of an anti-Semitic stereotypic image, or "Feindbild," as it emerged in public discourse in the 1986 Austrian presidential campaign of Kurt Waldheim (Wodak et al 1990, Mitten 1992, Gruber 1991).
This study addressed the problem of anti-Semitic language behavior in contemporary Austria, in other words, linguistic manifestations of prejudice toward Jews. It is important to emphasize that anti-Semitic language behavior can, though it need not, imply explicitly held and/or articulated hostility toward Jews, but it does imply the presence of prejudicial assumptions about Jews as a group. For example, the slogan *Kill Jews* painted on the Sigmund Freud monument in Vienna clearly does contain an explicit, but anonymous, imperative call for the most hostile of actions against Jews. On the other hand, a Jewish joke, which can have various meanings depending on the setting, the participants, and the function of the utterance, also forms part of what we have termed anti-Semitic language behavior, but only in circumstances where the joke intentionally expresses negative anti-Jewish prejudices.

In the study of the 1986 Waldheim affair (Wodak et al 1990), it was shown that the context of the discourse does have a significant impact on the structure, function, and content of prejudice stories. Even the choice of disclaimers—if they are used at all—is dependent on the context.

In the Waldheim affair study, context had to be defined in various ways because of the many layers of discourse that were analyzed. On the one hand, allowance was made for the official norms and taboos regarding anti-Semitic utterances in postwar Austria, i.e. one is not allowed to utter anti-Semitic utterances in public. On the other hand, in this study data were analyzed from the very specific historical context of the Waldheim affair, in which elements of anti-Semitic prejudice surfaced in public discourse (this study clearly showed the syncretic character of anti-Semitism mentioned above); because of the role played by the World Jewish Congress and international opinion in the disclosure of documents about Waldheim’s past, certain anti-Semitic topics, such as the “world Jewish conspiracy” or the “tricky, dishonorable Jew,” were more pronounced. Finally, the study included an analysis of the narrow context of each utterance, its setting, the participants, and the audience.

The discourse-historical approach has been elaborated in several more recent studies, for example, in a study on racial discrimination against immigrants from Romania (Matouschek et al 1995) and in a study on the discourse about nation and national identity in Austria (Wodak et al 1998).

The first study focused on the genesis of racist discourse that evolved in the media after the fall of the Iron Curtain. The second study was concerned with the analysis of the relationship between the discursive construction of national sameness and the discursive construction of difference, which leads to political and social exclusion of specific outgroups.

The findings in the latter study suggest that discourses about nations and national identities rely on at least four types of discursive macro-strategies: constructive strategies (aiming at the construction of national identities), preservative or justificatory strategies (aiming at the conservation and reproduction of national identities or narratives of identity), transformative strategies (aiming at the change of national identities), and destructive strategies (aiming at the dismantling of national identities). Depending on the context—that is to say, on the
social field or domain where the discursive events related to the topic take place—one or another of the aspects connected with these strategies is brought into prominence.

In all three studies taken from the Austrian context, racist and anti-Semitic as well as chauvinist utterances occurred simultaneously, especially in everyday conversations (which were tape-recorded on the streets for the first study). In more official settings, nationalist, racist, and anti-Semitic stereotypes occurred in a very vague form, mostly as allusions and implicit evocations triggered by the use of vocabulary that was characteristic of the historical period of National Socialism.

As mentioned above, anti-Semitic and racist discourses are both of a syncretic nature. Their discursive strategies (e.g. of dissimilation, negative presentation, and exclusion) and their linguistic realizations can be similar, but the contents of the stereotypes vary. The new immigrants from the former Eastern bloc countries are seen as lazy, dirty, criminal, and (as far as men are concerned) sexually threatening. The Jews often are viewed as rich, intellectual, and as having worldwide connections. Especially in Germany, anti-Semitic stereotypes often appear in the mask of philo-Semitism (Ster 1991): The previously negative prejudices are changed into extremely positive ones and appear as such in a new stereotypic discourse. The specific discourse-analytical approach presented here is three dimensional: After having (a) uncovered the contents or topics of a specific racist, anti-Semitic, nationalist, or ethnicist discourse, (b) the discursive strategies (including argumentation strategies) are investigated, and (c) the linguistic means and the specific, context-dependent linguistic realizations of the discriminatory stereotypes are then looked into.

We now briefly illustrate the discourse-historical approach with an example of political racist discourse, taken from an interview with Jörg Haider, the leader of the Austrian Freedom Party (FPÖ). The interview was printed in the Austrian weekly profil (No. 9/1997:19). The topic was a directive (Weisung) issued on November 26, 1996, by the FPÖ politician Karl-Heinz Grasser, deputy head of the government of the Province of Carinthia in Austria and also the highest official (Landesrat) in the Carinthian building and tourist industries. In his directive, Grasser instructed his consultant (Referenten) for roadwork to include a regulation in the tender invitations for public building projects that such projects were to be carried out exclusively by indigenous (heimisch) workers or by workers from states of the European Union. As a consequence, an intense public discussion arose and there was strong protest against Grasser’s proposal to institutionalize such an exclusionary practice. Finally, Grasser revoked the directive. During the discussion, Jörg Haider was interviewed about the “Grasser affair.” The journalist from profil, Klaus Dutzler, asked Haider what he, as leader of the FPÖ, was going to recommend to Grasser, his fellow party member and protégé. An English translation of the excerpt from that interview follows:

9The discursive construction of the Other through the strategy of dissimilation is the precondition for every prejudiced discourse.
profil: You will not recommend Karl-Heinz Grasser to give in?

Haider: We never thought differently and will continue to do so. The indignation, of course, only comes from the side of those like the Carinthian guild master for construction, a socialist, who makes money out of cheap labor from Slovenia and Croatia. And if, today, one goes by one of Hans Peter Haselsteiner’s Illbau building sites, and there the foreigners, up to Black Africans, cut and carry bricks, then the Austrian construction worker really thinks something. Then one must understand, if there are emotions.”

The excerpt in the original German is as follows:

profil: Sie werden Karl-Heinz Grasser nicht empfehlen nachzugeben?


Haider’s answer is remarkable with respect to the employed referential strategies, the negative other-presentation by the attributions and predications directed against the different groups of them, and the enthymemic argumentation serving the justification of emotions against the foreigners “even Black Africans.”

The social actors mentioned by the journalist are Jörg Haider, social deictically addressed as “Sie” (the German formal term of address), and Karl-Heinz Grasser. The social actors mentioned by Haider are—in chronological order of their sequential appearance—“we,” “the socialist Carinthian guild master for construction,” “cheap labor from Slovenia and Croatia,” “the building contractor” (and politician of the Austrian party Liberales Forum) Hans Peter Haselsteiner, the “foreigners,” “Black Africans,” and “the Austrian construction worker.”

There are at least three strategic moves in this short transcript from the interview.

The first is the political self-presentation of the FPÖ as a party with firm positions that acts publicly in unison. Thus, Haider woos the voters’ favor.

According to the question asked by the journalist, one would expect an answer with a transitivity structure in which Haider (as a sayer) would recommend [a verbal or/and mental process in Halliday’s (1994) terms] to Grasser (the receiver or target) that he do something (a proposal). Haider does not meet this expectation. He refuses to show himself explicitly as a leader advising his fellow party member in public (and thereby threatening Grasser's and the party’s reputation) and instead finds refuge in a referentially ambiguous “we” (rather than using the expected “I”), which helps to evade the exclusive referential focus both on Grasser and on himself. The ambivalent “we” allows for different, although not
mutually exclusive interpretations. On the one hand, it can be understood as a "party we," which is designated to demonstrate a closed, unanimous, fixed position of the whole party on the issue in question. The temporal deixis by past and future tense backs this conjecture. If one knows the history of the FPÖ and the fact that Haider has been an authoritarian party leader since he came into power in 1986, on the other hand, one is led to interpret the "we" as a sort of pluralis maiestatis that is employed to regulatively prescribe how the party members of the FPÖ are required to think at that moment and in future.

However, after having introduced this ambiguous "we," that, in addition to having the two functions just mentioned, invites the potential voters of the FPÖ to acclaim or join Haider's position, Haider then sets out to present the critics of the directive negatively. This is the second strategic move. Haider deliberately chooses two prominent critics (who are also political adversaries) as partes pro toto in the groups of critics. He debases the socialist Carinthian guild master (whom he does not identify by proper name) by depicting him as an unsocial, capitalist socialist who exploits cheap labor from Slovenia and Croatia (here, one may take note of Haider's impersonal and abstract reference to human beings as a cheap labor force). This image of the unsocial capitalist who egoistically wants to profit from wage dumping is also inferentially passed on to the second political opponent mentioned by Haider. (We can assume that the reader knows from the Austrian political context that the building contractor, Hans Peter Haselsteiner, is a politician.)

The third strategic move by Haider is partly embedded in the negative presentation of Hans Peter Haselsteiner. It is realized as an imaginary scenario (with the character of an argumentative exemplum) and aims to justify the emotions of hostility toward foreigners. This move relies on a shift of responsibility—in rhetorical terms, on a traiectio in alium that places the blame on Haselsteiner and the socialist Carinthian guild master, instead of on those who have racist emotions and instead of on Haider himself (for instigating populism).

Haider's third move contains a blatant racist utterance. Here, the party leader discursively constructs a discriminatory hierarchy of "foreigners" around the phenotypic feature of skin color—strictly speaking, around the visible "deviation" (the color black) of a specific group of foreigners (i.e. Black Africans) from the "average white Austrian." Most probably it is no accident that Haider refers to "Black Africans," that is to say, he explicitly uses the word black. In the context given, the attribute "black" has an intensifying function. It helps Haider to carry his black-and-white portrayal to extremes in a literal sense as well. Haider seems to intend to construct the greatest possible visual difference between Austrians and foreigners. His utterance can thus be seen as an example of "differentialist racism" in its literal sense. The outgroups of "the foreigners, even Black Afri-

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10Viewed from an argumentation analytical perspective, Haider argues here at one and the same time secundum quid, i.e. taking a part (as two critics) for the whole (as for all critics of Grasser's directive), and ad hominem, (i.e. he employs a fallacy of relevance) (see Lanham 1991:779), and he disparages the character of the critics in order to call into question the credibility of all critics instead of attacking their arguments.
cans” (the definite article is characteristic for stereotypical discourse) employed as construction workers are opposed to the ingroup of construction workers. Haider apostrophizes the latter synecdochically as “the Austrian construction worker.” As their self-appointed spokesman, he asks for understanding for the Austrian workers’ “emotions” in the face of “the foreign, and even Black African” workers. At this point, Haider does not argue why one should understand the “emotions.” He simply relies on the discriminatory prejudice (functioning as an inferable “warrant” in this enthymemic argumentation) that “foreigners” take away working places from “ingroup” members. Furthermore, he relies on the unspoken postulate that Austrians, in comparison with foreigners, should be privileged with respect to employment.

However, it is not just Haider’s argumentation that is shortened, incomplete, and vague. In particular, the naming of the prejudicial (mental, attitudinal), verbal, and actional hostilities to foreigners is extremely evasive and euphemistic in Haider’s utterance. In this regard, Haider exclusively identifies and names mental and emotional processes: With respect to foreigners (including Black Africans), the Austrian construction worker is clearly thinking of something (the German particle schon (really) serves here as an inference-triggering device that suggests comprehensibility). And in his last sentence, Haider deposits a very euphemistic concluding overall claim with an instigatory potential: One is obligated (must) to be understanding if there are emotions. In other words, the “emotions” and whatever the reader of Haider’s interview connects with this nonspecific cover term are totally justifiable.

Discourse Strands and Collective Symbols

S. Jäger and the Duisburg group are probably the most prominent researchers in Germany dealing with issues of racism and discourse (see S Jäger 1992, 1993; M Jäger 1996; Jäger & Jäger 1992; S Jäger & Januschek 1992; Butterwegge & Jäger 1993; Kalpaka & Rhätzel 1986; Link 1990, 1992). The research was triggered largely by the racism that started shortly after 1992, when new and stricter immigration laws were implemented in Germany. Simultaneously, the unification of West Germany and the former communist East Germany erupted in racist violence against many foreigners who were physically attacked and whose asylum homes were set afire. Inter alia, this violence was, and continues, to be connected to the fact that the unification poses tremendous cultural and economic problems.

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11 The racist intensification in the use of “even Black Africans” implies that in Austria, Black African workers, because of their most visible otherness, are an even worse evil than other foreigners, and therefore functions as argumentative backing.
12 M Jäger adopts the same theoretical framework as S Jäger. One of her main interests is the relationship between gender and racism (see M Jäger 1993, 1996). In her analysis of interviews, she proves that sexism and racism are interconnected in multiple ways, especially in discourse about Turkish men and women. We are limited by considerations of space and so omit discussion of this issue to concentrate on the theoretical and methodical innovations proposed by the Duisburg group.
for the Germans and that foreigners provide a comfortable scapegoat (e.g. that millions of people lost their jobs post-unification) for these problems. The Duisburg group has been very active not only in its research and documentation of racism, but also in proposing strategies against it.

In several respects, the group follows and extends the research of van Dijk. They interview different groups of people to elicit their attitudes toward foreigners and Jews and also ask many questions about their housing, their economic situation, and the European Union. In contrast to standard methods for conducting interviews, their method leads people to tell their personal stories and narratives in depth. The Duisburg group has also done media analysis, in particular, of the German tabloid, Bildzeitung, which launched large campaigns against foreigners. The main focus of their analysis is discourse semantics, for example, the uncovering of collective symbols (those immediately understood by all members of the same speech community) (see Link 1982, 1988, 1990, 1992) that are tied together in discourse strands, best explained as thematically interrelated sequences of homogenous discourse fragments [a text or a part of a text that deals with a specific topic, for example with the topic of "foreigners" and "foreigner issues" (in the widest sense)] (S Jäger 1993:181), which appear on different discourse levels (i.e. science, politics, media, education, everyday life, business life, and administration).

Let us cite just one example of a collective symbol, namely the metaphor of the submarine (U-Boot): “Das U-boot ist vor allem Aufgrund seiner Ambivalenz das gleichzeitig gefährlichste und faszinierendste Symbol "unseres" militantly geschlossenen Industriesystems ... wenn das Boot mit Torpedos die Tanker jagt, verwandelt es sich selbst in einen Hai, stellt noch Subversion und Chaos in den Dienst des Systems” (Link 1984:15, quoted in S Jäger 1993:161). (English translation: Primarily because of its ambivalence, the submarine is simultaneously the most dangerous and fascinating symbol of "our" militantly closed industrial systems...if the boat chases tankers with torpedos, it transforms itself into a shark and utilizes even subversion and chaos for the system.) The German expression U-Boot is not only used in technologized discourse. As metaphor, it also connotes the meaning it had during the Third Reich, when Jews living in hiding in Germany were labeled as U-Boote. This is a case where the analysis has to make allowance for context-specific historical knowledge.

The construction of “the Other” is also analyzed with a focus on the pronominal system, on the connotations of specific nouns, verbs, and adjectives, on stylistic features, on tense, mood, and modality, on specific syntactic means and structures, and on argumentation strategies, which are all employed in the self-presentation and other-presentation through discourse (S Jäger 1993).

The results of the Duisburg studies are astounding and troubling: Both latent and manifest forms of racism in Germany are growing and the interdiscourse (the synchronic totality of shared interdiscursive elements—like collective symbols, which are acquired through socialization) is larded with racist utterances and allusions. Anti-Semitism seems to have been widely replaced by racism against Turks living in Germany, and some of the same racist stereotypes used against Jews in
previous times are now used against Turks. This does not mean that Germany is free of anti-Semitism (see Stern 1991, Bergmann & Erb 1991, Bergmann et al 1995). As mentioned above, anti-Semitism has instead been covered by a philo-Semitic inversion in public discourse. The statements about Turks and other foreigners are, however, crude and explicit.

The Duisburg researchers use Michel Foucault’s theory of power and discourse and elements of van Dijk’s socio-cognitive model (see above) for their theoretical bases. In contrast to van Dijk and similar to the discourse-historical approach, the social, political, and historical contexts are integrated into the analysis of the group’s discourse. They have developed an elaborate method for studying the macro- and micro-levels of discourse (see S Jäger 1993, M Jäger 1996, Titscher et al 1998). They adhere to a wide notion of racism that denotes the exclusion of others because of certain biological or cultural characteristics. The group in power employs collective symbols to stigmatize, marginalize, and exclude minority groups. In the Duisburg group’s analysis, racism is tied to power. The analysis does not label exclusionary utterances as racist when verbalized by groups that are not in power (M Jäger 1996:15; see also Mitten & Wodak 1993).

Within this paradigm, “discourse” is defined as a social, not an individual, behavior: “I understand discourse as institutionalized language behavior, this language behavior determines actions and possesses power. This discourse is also real, constitutes reality” (Link 1983:60). Consequently, discourse does not manifest actions: It is action. Thus, discourse analysis has to be conceived as analysis of society that aims at disentangling the net of the entire discourse of a society by bringing out the single discourse strands on the single discourse levels (S Jäger 1993:184).

Interdiscourse—in which the culture and traditions of a society at a certain time are sedimented—is opposed to the (scientific) “specialized discourse” and, as mentioned above, conceptualized as systems of collective symbols connected to each other through certain ruptures in the images (Catachreses).

The contradictions that arise from the clash of different systems of collective symbols are most significant for this type of analysis (see S Jäger 1993:157 ff.). Although each single text is seen as a discourse fragment that may be a part of the interdiscourse, more than one discourse fragment can be contained in a single text. This is the case if a text refers to different, clearly separable topics.

The Duisburg researchers analyze their materials in a qualitative way. They argue that the precise and differentiated study of discourse fragments gives insight into the interdiscourse and that quantitative analyses are therefore neces-
sary only in certain cases: An accurate analysis of a specific racist discourse fragment, belonging to a specific discourse strand on a specific discourse level, may serve as an illustration of the entire racist discourse in Germany.

Interesting findings might result if researchers applied this form of analysis to other cultures and arrived at intercultural comparisons that might explain the different nature, history, and manifestation of racism, even in neighboring and culturally similar countries.

**The Loughborough Group**

The sociopsychologists Wetherell & Potter (1992) oppose socio-cognitive approaches that give absolute priority to the cognitive dimension in the analysis of racism and tend to universalize the conditions for racism (see above; see also Potter & Wetherell 1987). They argue from a constructivist point of view that attitudes and stereotypes are not simply mediated via cognition, but that discourse is actively constitutive of both social and psychological processes, and thus also of racist prejudices. In the manner of Billig (1978, 1985, 1988) and Billig et al (1988), Wetherell & Potter (1992:59) posit that racism must be viewed as a series of ideological effects with flexible, fluid, and varying contents. Racist discourses should therefore not be viewed as static and homogeneous but as dynamic and contradictory. Even the same person can voice contradictory opinions and ideological fragments in the same discursive event. Consequently, Wetherell & Potter take up Billig’s notion of ideological dilemmas. Furthermore, they also reject the concept of an immutable identity (see also Wodak et al 1998 for a dynamic conceptualization of identity).

Wetherell & Potter (1992:70) sympathize with, and adopt, the concepts of the “politics of representation” and the “definitional slipperiness” of neo-Marxist and postmodern theoreticians (see e.g. Hall 1994). In part, they have been influenced theoretically by some of Foucault’s theses and remarks on discourse, power, and truth, as well as by the neo-Marxist and postmodern theoreticians. They reject the social identity theory and the social cognition approach for lingering perceptualism (Wetherell & Potter 1992:47) and criticize the approaches of Miles and of the critical theory for Marxist determinism (Wetherell & Potter 1992:18 ff.) and for a traditional Marxist concept that refers to ideology as false consciousness (Wetherell & Potter 1992:69)—a critique that, in our view, is at best partly valid.

Like the Duisburg group and in the discourse-historical theorization, the Loughborough group stresses the context-dependence of racist discourse. They analyze interviews with people from New Zealand from a social-psychologist, ethnographic, and post-structuralist perspective, apply a detailed method in the investigation of discourse, and try to make the dynamics of racist ideologies explicit by including context information. They bring out the ideological dilemmas and the manifest and latent argumentation patterns (Wetherell & Potter 1992:178 ff, 1992:208 ff).

They define their task as mapping the language of racism in New Zealand and draw up a racist topography by charting themes and ideologies through explora-
tion of the heterogeneous and layered texture of racist practices and representations that make up a part of the hegemonic taken-for-granted in this particular society. That which is obvious and widely unquestioned characterizes a culture and society: The researchers specify which political actions will be considered legitimate and which will be considered merely trouble-making. They describe what counts as social progress and how it can be impeded, and they provide a sense of what racism is and how it should most appropriately be countered.

Wetherell & Potter argue that racism is organized through discursive patterns of signification and representation. Therefore, it has to be investigated through the analysis of discourse. Nevertheless, they state that “[w]e are not wanting to argue that racism is a simple matter of linguistic practice. Investigations of racism must also focus on institutional practices, on discriminatory actions and on social structures and social divisions. But the study of these things is intertwined with the study of discourse. Our emphasis will be on ways in which a society gives voice to racism and how forms of discourse institute, solidify, change, create and reproduce social formations” (Wetherell & Potter 1992:4). Again, discourse is seen as real action constituting reality.

In New Zealand, the history of racism is largely interrelated with the history of colonization (Wetherell & Potter 1992:22). In the main, the Maori become members of the working class. Racist ideology is the means used by the ruling class to consolidate and reproduce its advantage. It does this by presenting its partial and sectional interests as the universal interests of the entire community. On the other hand, “[t]he experience of racism can produce a cohesive, effective and even a powerful platform as Maori people, in the New Zealand case, recognize some crucial joint interests, despite their different positions in an economic hierarchy” (Wetherell & Potter 1992:73).

According to Althusser, ideology is not just ideas; it also concerns the practical conduct and bodily existence of human beings (Wetherell & Potter 1992:28). Many cognitive researchers believe in a reality that is separate from discourse, which is individually and socially perceived. In social cognition analysis, Wetherell & Potter criticize, the perceiver often remains a lone individual who forms, apparently in isolation, her or his account of racial traits on the basis of actual similarities and differences between the individuals whom she or he encounters. The social-cognitive model of the representational process pits a self-contained individual against the complexities of the real environment. Wetherell & Potter complain that cognition theory suffers from an absence of social theory—which actually seems to be the case. Nevertheless, some of the social-cognitive researchers, for example van Dijk, stress that they refer to group cognitions and not to individuals.

Similarities between the Loughborough and Duisburg approaches go beyond emphasis on context-dependence and post-structuralist alignment. The Duisburg concept of interdiscourse, at least in part, has its counterpart in the Loughborough concept of interpretative repertoire, i.e. “...broadly discernible clusters of terms, descriptions and figures of speech often assembled around metaphors or vivid images. In more structuralist language we can talk of these things as systems of
signification and as the building blocks used for manufacturing versions of actions, self and social structures in talk. They are some of the resources for making evaluations, constructing factual versions and performing particular actions” (Wetherell & Potter 1992:90).

However, in its concrete analyses, the Loughborough group mainly focuses on narratives and argumentation and does not pay as much attention to metaphors or symbols as do Link, S Jäger, and their associates.

Another parallel between the two approaches is that both adhere to postmodernism in their criticism of the concepts of the individual and the subject. But whereas the Duisburg group sometimes risks reification of the concept of discourse and thus of opening the way to relativism and determinism, Wetherell & Potter, although themselves not neatly protected from relativism, warn explicitly against viewing discourses “...as potent causal agents in their own right, with the processes of interest being the work of one (abstract) discourse on another (abstract) discourse, or the propositions or ‘statements’ of that discourse working smoothly and automatically to produce objects and subjects” (1992:90).

However, the issue of agency and the question of the dialectics between individual actions and social formations cannot be answered adequately in this review. It should be followed through in forthcoming research on discourse and racism.

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